[Largely plagiarized summary of select portions of the second chapter of C.S. Lewis’ The Problem of Pain.]
If you say “God can create a creature with free will and at the same time withhold free will from it” you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words, “God can.”
Intrinsic impossibility
“In ordinary usage the word impossible generally implies a suppressed clause beginning with the word unless.” For example, it is impossible for Johnny to win [unless Mark, Brian and Tony are all disqualified]. However, there are some kinds of impossibility that are intrinsically self-contradictory, and are thus absolutely impossible. That is, the sentence has no qualifying clause, and is impossible in all worlds under all conditions for all agents. For example, “That square box is round.” The only way this could be true is if the nature of space were different from that we currently experience; but such a condition is entirely outside the realm of scientific speculation.
The omnipotence of God does not mean that he can do the intrinsically impossible. “You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense.” The old question “Can God make a rock that is too heavy for him to lift” is mere wordplay. “It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but nonentities.”
What comes with our self-identity
Any attempt to remove from the existence of free beings the possibility of bad choice is intrinsically impossible in the sense above.
I cannot be me (or at least be self-conscious) unless I perceive myself in contrast to non-me (e.g. you). If we had at all times identical thoughts, passions, and choices, then how might I comprehend my individuality apart from you?
If we are able to perceive each other, to have a mutually conscious co-relation between our beings, then we must exist in an environment which enables a contrast between us. “The minimum condition of self-consciousness and freedom would be that the creature should apprehend God and, therefore, itself as distinct from God.”
This environment which enables yours and my mutual perception and relationship must be objective, that is, of a fixed nature and distinct from either of us. If, as the existentialist says, I create reality, then you don’t really exist; you are a mere character in the play which I am writing. Similarly, if we both exist, but the environment is entirely in my control, then you would be quite incapable of communicating with me or making your presence known to me, because you would be unable to manipulate matter, i.e., the means of communication between our selves. I would be animate, but you would be trapped inside a manequin. Therefore, two souls must meet in a world that is objective and “fixed”, that is, not entirely subject to my will or yours.
Now, if we are truly agents of choice created to choose, or relational beings created to relate to God, and if choice or relationship requires an objective medium through which two beings interact, then the ability to choose that which is not God, comes as part and parcel, quite unavoidably.
Now, could God have created a world in which all our bad choices would have been obviated and all bad consequences evaporated immediately? Well, if we could abstract this scenario, we would find our choice, our identity, our very selves, to be quite stripped away. If only one of our options would actually have a result, and the other action would have its effects slurped up by divine benevolence, then we would really only have one truly option. The right to choose includes the right to have the results of your choice. It seems God is not interested in pandering us as little children; he gives us, Lewis says in another chapter, the “intolerable compliment” of a world that allows the effects of our choices to play out without his (direct) interference.
So we conclude simply this, that our mere existence as free, self-conscious individuals contains within it, naturally and inseparably, the possibility of bad choices. This seems to be simply “how things are,” woven into the fabric of the universe in which our minds can operate. There are no alternative “ways it could have been.”
This train of thought – the inexorable existence of the possibility of bad choice in the world, and its seeming inevitability – brings us to question why God decreed that we would be such dreadfully free creatures (us). We thus take a step up from questioning the omnipotence of God, to engage the more challenging and intriguing question of his goodness.